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ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the First Amendment issues present in the NFL
National Anthem controversy. Part I introduces the state action doctrine and
analyzes the various tests courts use to make a finding of state action within
private organizations. Then, these tests are applied to the NFL through
observing the roles of the United States military and the President and how
their direct involvement may have created the appearance of state action
within a private organization. Part II further builds on the state action claim,
examining the role of employee compelled speech in a private organization
following state action. Finally, Part III concludes with how these legal issues
will affect the next round of collective bargaining in 2021.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
pre-season game in 2016,

Anthem ceremony.1 While the rest of his teammates remained standing
during the ceremony, Kaepernick and one other player, Eric Reid, kneeled to
protest the police brutality against ethnic minorities within the United States.2
attention by other players in the NFL, and they too began to kneel. This
phenomenon sparked an enormous controversy o
Collective Bargaining Agreement makes no mention of the National Anthem,
encourages players to stand during the
National Anthem ceremony.3 This made it questionable as to whether the
status
as a private organization, it seems as though the NFL was legally permitted
to require that all its players refrain from kneeling and to require them to
relationship with the government and other public institutions, the NFL might
be hovering over the edge of state actor status, therefore placing it within the
sphere of public functions subject to the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
These legal issues will certainly be at the very forefront of discussions as we
approach negotiations for the new 2021 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
A.

The State Action Doctrine and Why It Matters

Under Section 1983 of the US Code, any person who acts on behalf of
protected by the US Constitution is liable to the injured party in the form of
a civil action.4 According to Section 1983,
1 ESPN News Servs., Colin Kaepernick Protests Anthem over Treatment of Minorities, THE
UNDEFEATED (Aug. 27, 2016), http://theundefeated.com/features/colin-kaepernick-protests-anthem-overtreatment-of-minorities/.
2 Id.
3 Alex Fitzpatrick, Does the NFL Require Players to Stand for the National Anthem?, TIME (Sept.
25, 2017), http://time.com/4955704/nfl-league-rulebook-a62-63-national-anthem-rume/.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
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resort to any legal remedy against the NFL for infringement of their freedom
of speech, the players must first assert that the NFL is a state actor or that it
5
in depriving the players of their First
Amendment rights protected by the US Constitution. This is essential to the
, because only public institutions are subject to the regulations
of the Constitution, as the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to apply to
state action only. As a result, private actors do not face the same scrutiny in
regard to a constitutional violation. While they may still face repercussions
for their actions, they cannot be held liable for violating the US Constitution.
B.

Private Actors and the State Action Doctrine

This situation prompts a very interesting question: Are private actors
permitted to freely violate the US Constitution? The answer to this question
is: not necessarily, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court has
been extremely hesitant to impose the US Constitution upon private actors;
color of state
Constitution.6 In one of the most articulate court opinions ever written,
Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette stated,
7
The
Supreme Court, almost forty years later, seemed to build upon this statement
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn
attributable to the state on certain occasions when the private party acted in
8
This seems to suggest that there are certain
situations where a private actor may be subject to the restraints of the
Constitution.
Barnette highlighted the significance of protecting the rights and
privileges guaranteed to US citizens by the US Constitution, and it involved
the Board of Education in West Virginia, which adopted a resolution
requiring students in public school to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance.9
to their religious beliefs, the Board expelled these students, and the parents
Amendment
rights.10 The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for the Board
5

Id.

6

Id.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
8 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 n.6 (1982).
7

9
10

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625 27.
Id. at 629.
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there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
12
With this statement, the Court hoped to drive home
the importance of protecting the very rights and privileges this nation was
built to protect.
The Supreme Court must meet a very high threshold to find that a private
entity is acting under the color of law and subject it to constitutional
liability.13 Nevertheless, the Court has considered several, yet rare,
occurrences where a private actor is held to be acting under the color of state
law and therefore liable under the US Constitution. The case of Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co. lays out a two-step test for when a defendant is subject
to Section 1983 liability.14
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a
rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
th the deprivation must be
15
The second part of the
test has given courts a difficult time, because there is no clear line as to when
a private actor becomes a state actor. The following factors have been
adopted to attempt to answer this question and give the courts some guidance
in determining whether a private actor should be held to the status of a state
actor. Specifically, these factors are aimed towards preventing private
organizations that mainta
depriving an individual of his rights and privileges secured by the US
Constitution.16
1.

Traditional and Exclusive Public Functions

A private entity may be held to be acting under the color of law when it
17

This test is extremely narrow, as the private organization must be
performing a function that only the government traditionally performs, such
11
12

Id. at 645.
Id. at 642.

13

HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 26 27 (2d ed. 2018).
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
15 Id.
14

16
17

See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 26.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982).
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as running general and primary elections,18 or providing services for a
private, company town.19 The Court in Marsh v. Alabama held that even
though the town was funded and operated through a private company, the
company did not have the authority to impose criminal punishment on a
resident for distributing religious literature throughout the town.20 The Court
Fourteenth Amendment rights despite its status as a private entity.21
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the
premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved,
took place, were held by others than the public, is not
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint
by the application of a state statute.22
This case presents a clear example of when the Court must attempt to
balance the rights and liberties of citizens with the rights of a private entity.
function of operating a fire department.23 The Fourth Circuit, relying on
previous case law
services had been the traditional and exclusive function of the state of
Maryland.24 The court made clear that this finding was a fact-specific inquiry
regarding only
and it did not rule on whether
firefighting services in the abstract were considered traditional and exclusive
functions of the state.25 Finally, the state can delegate its exclusive and
traditional functions to private entities, which then places the private entity
26
This was the case in Fabrikant v. French,
where the Second Circuit held that the private Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was acting under the delegated authority of New
York to seize and sterilize dogs.27 Thus, the SPCA was acting as a state actor

18
19

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 63 (1953).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).

20

Id. at 509.
Id. at 508 09.
22 Id. at 509.
21

23

Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 344 45.
25 Id. at 344.
24

26
27

Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 210 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 210 11.
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Instances where
courts have not found a private organization to be performing exclusive and
traditional government functions include managing hospitals and healthcare
facilities,29 operating educational facilities,30 and regulating interscholastic
athletics.31 As a result, only very few functions have been held to be exclusive
and traditional government functions.
2.

Symbiotic Relationship

The symbiotic relationship test has been the broadest and most
controversial application in which the Supreme Court has found a private
entity to be acting under the color of law.32 This test derives from the case of
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.33 In Burton, a private restaurant had
leased space in a public parking garage where it operated on a twenty-year
lease.34 The restaurant refused to serve an African American customer,
violating equal protection.35 The restaurant argued that because it was a
private entity, it was not subject to the United States Constitution; however,
the Court did not accept this argument as a compelling one.36 The Court
parking garage in the variety of mutual benefits both retained.37 The
restaurant had easily available access for its customers to park, and the
parking garage benefited from the lease payments made by the restaurant.38
Further, the restaurant did not want to serve African Americans because it
made more money catering to whites only, and because the public parking
money, it was indirectly benefiting from the
private discrimination against African Americans.39 This joint relationship
the color of law, and therefore subject to the US Constitution.40 It is unclear

28

Id.

29

McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 230 31 (2d Cir. 2014).
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 43 (1982).

30
31
32

See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 29.

33

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).
Id. at 719.
35 Id. at 720.
34

36

Id. at 723 25.
Id. at 724.
38 Id.
37

39
40

See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 29.
Burton, 365 U.S. at 726.
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how persuasive the symbiotic relationship test is, as the Court has only relied
on it in Burton and not in any later cases dealing with private entities and
state action.41
However, the Third Circuit has found a symbiotic relationship between
the state and two private universities when the state legislature specifically
serve as a State-related institution in the Commonwealth System of higher
ate statute.42 While the court discussed the financial
relationship between the universities and the state, it held that this alone was
not enough to find a symbiotic relationship present.43 There must be more
than just a financial relationship in existence. The Third Circuit also focused
determination and that the funds must be kept in a certain account.44 The
statute creates a tax exemption for the universities, allows for the State to
choose onefile annual reports of university activities.45 As a result, the private
universities had an interdependent, symbiotic relationship with the state.46 In
addition, the New York Southern District applied the symbiotic relationship
test to find state action present between the MLB and the state of New York
for purposes of striking down an MLB rule prohibiting female reporters from
entering the Stadium clubhouses.47 The court focused on the similarities
between this case and Burton, highlighting the fact that the city of New York
and the Yankees shared a mutually beneficial relationship.48 The court relied
on a five prong test to make its finding of state action. The test examines:
governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of
governmental regulation involved; (3) whether or not aid is
given to all similar institutions or is suggestive of
particular case; (4) whether or not the institution under attack
performs a public function; and (5) the legitimacy of the

41

See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 30.
Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 1984).
43 Id. at 101.
42

44

Id. at 102.
Id.
46 Id. at 103.
45

47
48

Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F.Supp. 86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 93.
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private in character,
in associational or constitutional terms.49
The court noted that this was a guiding principle, and the absence of one
prong did not automatically render state action inapplicable.50 The Yankees
are financially dependent on the City and its publicly funded stadium, while
the City benefits economically from the sale of tickets and fans attending
games.51
including ticket prices and stadium rules.52 For the fifth prong, the appellate
court balanced the interests of the private entity remaining private against the
harm to the public from the alleged offensive conduct.53 Because the claim
here was sex discrimination, the fifth prong was clearly met, and the court
made a finding of state action.54
3.

Close Nexus

Another test courts can apply to find a private actor acting under the
color of law is to look for a close
and the government.55 The finding of a close nexus is also very limited, as
actions.56 The Ninth Circuit held that a close nexus was present in Chudacoff
v. University Medical Center, when private physicians were performing their
duties as part of a state-mandated medical program.57
such a close
nexus between the State and the challenged action that the
58
conduct may be fairly
Despite the fact
that the doctors were privately employed, the University Medical Center
received its authority to regulate the physicians through state law, and
action.59 Further, a close
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must
49
50

Id. at 95.
Id.

51

Id.
Id.
53 Id.
52

54

Id. at 96.
See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 30.
56 Id.
57 Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).
55

58 Id.
295 96 (2001)).
59 Id.
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60

The Second Circuit applied this
principle in United States v. Stein
enforcement of a policy that stopped advancing legal fees to defendants was
state action.61 The court reasoned that because the state gave off the
policy.62 The accounting firm had no choice except to comply with the
government further reinforced compliance through its emphasis that
misconduct could not be rewarded under the federal guidelines.63 Because
the fee policy was the subject of the complaint, the state must be liable for its
effects.64
The Supreme Court has only applied the close nexus test in one case
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.65 The plaintiff in Moose Lodge sued a private
club under Section 1983 for denying him service based on racial
discrimination.66 The club claimed that it was a private entity and not subject
to Section 1983; however, the Court held that because the state liquor board
issued the club a license that permitted it to sell alcohol, the club was a state
actor for purposes of Section 1983.67
forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state action
68
The ideology behind the
close nexus theory is that if the government delegates authority to a private
entity and the private entity practices unconstitutional regulations, the
government then becomes a supporter of the harmful, private conduct.69 As
become public functions, which subjects the private organization to
constitutional regulation.70

60

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008).
62 Id. at 148.
61

63

Id.
Id. at 147.
65 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 31.
64

66

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).
Id.
68 Id. at 172.
67

69
70

See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 31.
Id.
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Entwinement

e entity
acting under the color of state law was in 2001 in Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass n.71 In this case, the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), a not-for-profit
corporation, regulated sports programs between private and public high
schools within the state of Tennessee.72 When the TSSAA concluded that
Brentwood Academy had violated a recruiting rule through undue influence
program on probation for four years, prohibiting the football and basketball
teams from competing for two years, and imposing a $3,000 fine.73
Brentwood filed suit against the TSSAA under Section 1983, claiming that
the TSSAA was a state actor and subject to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.74
regulator of interscholastic athletics, along with the Board of Education who
but the TSSAA still played a regulatory function.75 However, because of this
between the TSSAA and the state too difficult to draw.76 Because the TSSAA
had only changed its title but continued to do the same work, the Court found
that there was still active state involvement.77 Instead, the Court stated that
nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its
1983.78 The Court in essence established an entwinement test for determining
when private entities are acting under the color of law. Entwinement is a very
similar concept to close nexus, but the crux of entwinement lies in the
, whereas close nexus
s conduct
rather than the organization itself.79

71

Id. at 32.

72
73
74

Id. at 293.
Id.

75

Id. at 301.
See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 32.
77 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 301.
76

78
79

Id. at 298.
See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 33.
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Because entwinement is a relatively recent test, not many cases have
relied on it. However, the Middle District of Tennessee relied on this doctrine
to find that a private bus company (DTO) that supplied drivers to a public
transport service (MTA) had created an appearance of entwinement.80 In the
past, MTA had selected the employees for its own system.81 However, once
MTA delegated the power to appoint employees to DTO, DTO was
82
ate with powers . .
Moreover,
the plaintiff also alleged that certain individuals who managed and controlled
83

As a result, the plaintiff alleged enough evidence to dispute issues of fact as
to whether DTO and MTA are sufficiently entwined for purposes of
liability.84
Overall, the Supreme Court has been very cautious in applying any of
these tests to a case dealing with private organizations and constitutional
constitutional rights with the reach of federal laws, these tests are not likely
under Section 1983 and the First Amendment. Nevertheless, there is an
argument to be made that the NFL is acting under the color of state law,
placing it within the sphere of constitutional limitations.
C.

Is the NFL Acting Under the Color of State Law?

The National Football League (NFL) is a private, professional football
organization founded in the United States and is made up of thirty-two
teams.85 The NFL is divided into two divisions the National Football
Conference (NFC) and the American Football Conference (AFC).86 Because
the organization is private in nature, it is not subject to many of the
constitutional limitations that are placed on public institutions. However, the
NFL does engage in business with several public entities. The question now
becomes: Exactly how much of
federal or state governments? Is this enough to hold the NFL as acting under

80

Thompson v. Davidson Transit Org., 563 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).

81

Id. at 827.
Id.
83 Id. at 827 28.
84 Id. at 828.
82

85 National
Football
League,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Football-League.
86 Id.

BRITANNICA

(2020),

408

Take an L or Take a Knee?

[Vol. 14:397

relationships with the federal government and state governments.
1.
The most important and relevant relationship that the NFL currently has
with a government entity is its contract with the United States military. The
main argument here is that the NFL could be acting under the color of state
law from its long historical relationship with the United States military,
culminating into a contract of millions of dollars a year to conduct pre-game
ceremonies including flyovers, military returns, and the National Anthem.87
This r
Pete Rozelle, a World War II Navy veteran, paved the way for the support of
NFL patriotism.88
lism.89 The 1968 Super Bowl featured
Department of Defense.90 The NFL pounced on this newly formed
relationship and began sending players on United Service Organization tours
abroad as a sign of appreciation to the military men and women.91 The 1980s
and 1990s brought closer ties between the NFL and United States military;
92
the winter version of the Fourth of J
If this was not enough
to show the close bond between the two entities, the tragic events on
September 11, 2001, further strengthened this inseparable bond between the
NFL and United States military.93 The NFL began engaging in more charity
work for the United States military through raising money for veteran
programs, conducting military tributes, and displaying camouflage uniforms
during games.94 However, throughout the years, the players were never
required to participate in any of these ceremonies or even stand on the field

87 Melanie Schmitz, How the NFL Sold Patriotism to the US Military for Millions,
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/nfl-dod-national-anthem6f682cebc7cd/.
88 Adam Kilgore, For Decades, the NFL Wrapped Itself in
Uneasy, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/for-decadesthe-nfl-wrapped-itself-in-the-flag-now-thats-made-business-uneasy/2018/09/06/bc9aab64-b05d-11e89a6a-565d92a3585d_story.html?utm_term=.d07e6dd217bb.
89 Id.
90

Id.
Id.
92 Id.
91

93
94

Id.
Id.
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during the National Anthem; they sat in the locker rooms instead.95 The
players began to take the field in 2009 when the NFL signed a formal contract
with the United States Department of Defense in which the NFL would
exhibit signs of patriotism in exchange for millions of dollars from the
Department of Defense.96 This tactic was seen as a marketing strategy for the
United States military, whose goal was to appeal to a wider audience in order
to recruit more enlistees.97 From 2011 to 2014, the Department of Defense
paid the NFL $5.4 million to conduct patriotic ceremonies for recruiting
measures.98 In addition, from 2013 to 2015 the National Guard also paid the
NFL $6.7 million for similar ceremonies.99 Is this long-standing relationship
a private organization, for purposes of establishing state action?
2.
Involvement with the NFL

military, President Trump has become actively involved in the
National Anthem issue and has spoken out about his disagreement with the
100
Some of his comments, many of which are found on
Twitter, include actions that the NFL should take in punishing the players for
kneeling during the National
disrespecting our Flag & Country, you will see change take place fast. Fire
101
President Trump has openly sided with those who believe the
players should stand during the National Anthem as a sign of respect for the
flag. His comments and posts have suggested that NFL owners should fire or
suspend players if they kneel during the anthem.102 President Trump also

95
96
97

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
99 Id.
100 See Brooke Singman,
,
N.Y. POST (May 30, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/05/30/how-trump-pushed-nfl-into-newanthem-rule-this-one-lifts-me/.
101 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 24, 2017, 3:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/911904261553950720?lang=en.
102 Id.; see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (SEPT. 23, 2017, 11:11 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/911654184918880260?lang=en ( If a player wants the
privilege of making millions of dollars in the NFL, or other leagues, he or she should not be allowed to
98
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expressed his views over this issue at a rally held in Alabama.103 He posed
this jarring question to the audience:
NFL owners when somebody disrespects our flag to say get that son of a bitch
104
These comments present
an interesting situation amongst all the controversy because, on the one hand,
the President may be giving his own opinion on the issue, which he is
permitted to do. However, on the other hand, he is speaking to the entire
nation when he addresses this issue in his presidential capacity. Another
example takes a step further beyond his mere opinion on the issue and instead
leave stadium if any players kneeled, disrespecting our country. I am proud
105
This tweet came after many people
criticized and praised Vice President Pence after he and his wife left an
Indianapolis Colts game where several players decided to kneel during the
National Anthem.106 While the previous examples seemed to express an
opinion, this was more. President Trump explicitly asked that Vice President
Pence leave if the players kneeled; this was a direct request made in his
capacity as President. Actions and words made by the President of the United
States certainly constitute that of a state actor, and because they are made in
an official capacity, President Trump is slowly injecting his power and
authority of a public office into a private organization. If requesting Vice
President Pence might not be enough to implicate state action, maybe the
meets this threshold.107
the NFL National Anthem issue have added to the chaotic mess of public
versus private for purposes of First Amendment violations. If the President
enough to make a finding of state action, what would the claim of state action

disrespect . . . our Great American Flag (or Country) and should stand for the National Anthem. If not,
103

Ian Schwartz,

,
REALCLEARPOLITICS
(Sept.
23,
2017),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/09/23/trump_nfl_owners_should_fire_the_son_of_a_bitch
_player_who_disrespects_our_flag_by_kneeling.html.
104 Id.
105 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017, 11:16 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/917091286607433728?lang=en.
106 Kevin Seifert, Mike Pence Leaves 49ers-Colts Game over Protesting During National Anthem,
ESPN (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/20955550/mike-pence-leaves-san-francisco49ers-indianapolis-colts-game-protesting-national-anthem.
107 Peter Baker & Ken Belson, Trump Threatens N.F.L. and Attacks Jemele Hill of ESPN, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/politics/trump-nfl-jemele-hill.html.
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look like? Would all of the tests lead to a conclusion of state action for the
NFL?
D.

The NFL and Joint-Participation

Of the four tests previously discussed and used by courts to find a private
actor liable under the United States Constitution, the most compelling one to
apply to the NFL is the symbiotic relationship test. Because the symbiotic
actor as engaging in state action, this likely would be the best opportunity to
subject the NFL to the restrictions of the First Amendment and the
Constitution.108 Similar to the public parking garage and private restaurant in
Burton
military where both entities benefit.109 The NFL helps advertise the United
States military by conducting all of its pre-game ceremonies including
flyovers, tributes, and the National Anthem. The United States military in
turn pays the NFL millions of dollars for these signs of patriotism. In
addition, just as the public garage in Burton indirectly benefited from the
-Americans, the United States military
also benefits from the NFL in its refusal to permit its players to protest during
the National Anthem.110
A more compelling argument for a symbiotic relationship between the
NFL and United States government lies in the Southern District of New
Ludtke.111
-prong test to determine
state action, the NFL meets several of the five factors. First, the NFL depends
on the government for financial support, through its contracts with the United
States military and through public funding for numerous stadiums. The
ear. Second,
advertising must be carried out (flyovers, National Anthem ceremony, etc.),
when it is to be conducted, and what to cover in the advertising. Third,
financial aid appears to be provided to similar institutions, like the NBA and
MLB;112 however, this does not prevent a showing of state action. Fourth, the

108
109
110
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Troop Tributes, SBNATION (Nov. 4, 2015, 4:11 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/2015/11/4/9670302/nflpaid-patriotism-troops-mcain-flake-report111

412

Take an L or Take a Knee?

[Vol. 14:397

NFL performs public functions in hosting football games, which are open to
the public to attend. Lastly, the legitima
must be weighed against the potential harm to the public in offensive
conduct.113 In this case, the courts should certainly focus on this last prong.
The potential harm to the public in not permitting the players to advocate
social justice matters is very high. The players occupy special positions in
society due to their status that allows them to use their platform for change.
In suppressing their voices on matters that are currently affecting our
communities, the NFL is essentially depriving the players of using their fame
for good. While the protesting may be controversial to some, it is nevertheless
an expression of speech that should be permissible in any setting. The gravity
of these issues far outweighs the financial concerns that the NFL may have
in not allowing this behavior.
Krynicky may lend some guidance for a claim of state action regarding the
NFL. While the financial relationship between the government and NFL is
would not be sufficient to make a finding of a symbiotic relationship.114 The
interdependent relationship with the state, a relationship where the state is
115
In order to
do this, we would need to know the contents of the contract between the
military and the NFL. Does the contract specify that the NFL must allocate
the funds in a certain way, like the government required the private
universities to do in Krynicky?116 Does the military require that the NFL place
the funds in a certain account, like the state specified in Krynicky?117 Does
requirement in Krynicky?118 One important criterion is that the NFL does
enjoy certain tax exemptions from the government, similar to the private
universities in Krynicky.119 Answers to all these questions are important

military to sponsor patriotic tributes during games).
113 See Ludtke, 461 F. Supp. at 96.
114 See Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the military to a heightened relationship, which could place the NFL in a
position of constitutional liability.
The other methods for finding state action within a private organization
do not seem applicable to the unique scenario confronting the NFL. Under
the narrowly-applied traditional and exclusive public functions test, the
military is a traditional and exclusive function of the state, and (2) that the
state delegated this exclusive function to a private entity, the NFL.120 The
first element would be very difficult to prove because the military is
promoted through many different media outlets, including television, radio,
movies, and music; for example, there are online military newspapers that
advertise the military,121 and there are even online military memberships that
help promote the military and advertise on their behalf in order to find jobs
for veterans.122 The online military newspaper also states at the bottom of the
home page that it is not a United States government publication.123 Further,
to make the argument that the government delegated this traditional and
exclusive function to the NFL is also a difficult scenario to present because
the government only has a financial relationship with the NFL. And as has
been stated, a financial relationship alone is not enough to prove state
action.124 The NFL would have to be performing specific functions that the
government traditionally performs, such as running elections or operating a
company town.125 In advertising the United States military, the NFL is not
performing a traditional and exclusive state function. This also presents a
distinguishable case from Fabrikant because in that case, the SPCA was
acting under the delegated authority of New York when it took on the task of
sterilizing dogs.126 Here, it cannot be said that the government effectively
127
when all the government
did was provide compensation in exchange for patriotism; the government
makes these deals with numerous other organizations.
In regard to close nexus theory, this, too, likely would fail because the
government is not affirmatively delegating any authority to the NFL through
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their relationship. This is crucial because for a close nexus to exist, the
acts.128 T
Chucadoff, where private doctors were performing medical care according to
a state-mandated program.129 Since the government is not authorizing the
NFL to engage in any official capacity, the government is not supporting the
argument for close nexus theory exists when discussing the coercive power
and significant encouragement of President Trump. Similar to the Second
nalysis in Stein, President Trump has relied on his coercive power
to pressure the NFL into punishing the players for protesting on the field.
Trump has taken to social media and press events to compel the NFL into
taking action against the players if the players choose to kneel during the
National Anthem. His comments have included firing or suspending players
for kneeling,130 threatening to end tax exemptions for the NFL if they take no
action on the issue,131 and requesting Vice President Pence to leave an NFL
game where players kneeled during the National Anthem.132 These coercive
comments might be enough to force the NFL to adopt certain policies against
the players. Like the accounting firm in Stein, which felt like it had no choice
but to adopt the faulty fee policy or go out of business,133 if the NFL believes
it has no choice but to cooperate with the government or lose its tax benefits
and reputation, this may be enough to make a claim of state action under the
close nexus theory.
Lastly, the argument for entwinement remains a rather weak one as well.
While the theory of entwinement has been the most recent test developed by
the Court, the criteria for it is not particularly prominent in the relationship
between the NFL and the United States military and President Trump.
private entity itself, not its conduct.134 In Brentwood Academy, the TSSAA
operated and functioned as a public entity in its regulation of interscholastic
sports between private and public schools.135 While it changed its identity
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from a public to private organization, it still maintained the same operations
as it previously had engaged in.136 The Court applied entwinement to
ase, there does not seem to be
any similar entity to the TSSAA, which blurs the distinction between private
and public and would allow the Court to make a finding of entwinement. Nor
does there seem to be a situation such as the one presented in Thompson,
where a public bus company delegated its power to appoint bus drivers to a
private bus company.137 Had the United States government been the main
entity in charge of promoting the military and then delegated this function to
the NFL and other sports organizations, then an argument regarding
entwinement might be more plausible. However, once again, the relationship
between the NFL and United States government appears to be more of a
financial one, and this by itself cannot sustain a finding of state action.
II. EMPLOYEE COMPELLED SPEECH
138

where any idea, good or bad, can flow freely without any government
the government cannot force an individual or group to support certain
139
The compelled speech doctrine expands the limitations placed
on government because it goes further than restraining the government from
prohibiting certain speech; the doctrine additionally states that the
government cannot reprimand anyone for choosing not to support a particular
view.140
But how does this doctrine play out in an employment context? Do
employees receive these same protections? Generally, private employers are
free to create restrictions they wish to impose on their employees. Because
the First Amendment is a safeguard against government intrusion, private
employers are typically shielded from its reach. However, employees of the
public sector have more narrowed rights when it comes to free speech
because their employer is the government.141 While they do have protected
rights, these rights are more conscripted. The landmark Supreme Court case
136
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outlining compelled speech is Barnette, where the Court held that the School
flag during the Pledge of Allegiance.142 The Court stated that the children
chose not to salute the flag for religious reasons, which is undeniably
protected under the First Amendment.143 For the School Board to expel these
children for exercising their First Amendment rights was a clear violation of
Section 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments.144 In the most
quoted phrase of the Barnette
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
145
While Barnette established the dangers of
compelled speech, it seems heavily applicable to speech in an employment
setting. Several cases later have seemed to uphold this belief in the
employment context, holding that the government cannot force a public
146

A.

Compelled Speech Cases in the Employment Context

Barnette seemed to lay the groundwork for compelled speech, but the
Court did not really apply this doctrine to the employment setting until the
1950s and 1960s.147 The world encompassing employee speech changed in
Pickering v. Board of
Education.148 This case involved a public-school teacher who was dismissed
from his job for criticizing the Board of Education in how it handled
proposals for raising revenue within the school district.149 The teacher sent a
letter to a newspaper condemning the way the Board allocated funds among
the educational and athletic programs. Once the Board saw the article, it fired
the teacher.150 The teacher sued the Board, claiming a violation of his First
Amendment right to free speech, but this was rejected by the lower courts.151
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On appeal, the Supreme Cou
ultimately held that it was.152 Because the teacher was speaking out about an
issue that affected members of the community, it was essential to afford his
speech protection.153
the
154

Pickering established the groundwork for protecting employee speech by
providing a balancing test. The solution is to balance the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, speaking out on matters of public concern, with the
romoting the efficiency of its services.155
The Court further elaborated on the employee speech balancing test in
Connick v. Meyers in 1983.156 The plaintiff in Connick was an Assistant
District Attorney who was terminated for distributing a questionnaire around
the office, which caused chaos among the staff.157 She claimed that her
termination violated the First Amendment, so the Court applied the Pickering
balancing test to determine if so.158
speech was on a matter of public concern, the Court stated that this must be
159
Based
on these criteria, the Court noted that the
as also relevant.160
The last important case to build on the Pickering balancing test was
Garcetti v. Ceballos in 2006.161 In Garcetti, the plaintiff was a deputy district
attorney who found serious misrepresentations in an affidavit being used to
obtain a search warrant.162 He told his supervisor about the inaccuracies, but
the supervisor decided to proceed with the prosecution.163 At trial, the
plaintiff was called by the defense to testify about the affidavit, and then he
was later subject to retaliatory employment actions for which he sued.164 The

152

Id. at 572.

153

Id.
Id. at 571.
155 Id.
156 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
154

157

Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
159 Id. at 147 48.
158

160

Id. at 152.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
162 Id. at 413.
161

163
164

Id. at 414.
Id. at 414 15.

418

Take an L or Take a Knee?

[Vol. 14:397

official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
165
Because the plaintiff spoke on matters pursuant to
his duty of being a deputy, he was not afforded First Amendment
protection.166
Building on employee speech are the cases that address the
unconstitutional nature of loyalty oaths. Wieman v. Updegraff involved state
employees who declined to take an oath required by the state of Oregon that
said the employee was not and had not been a member of any communist
organization.167 The employer brought suit, attempting to withhold the state
168
The state employees
argued primarily that this oath violated their Due Process rights in attempting
to bar them from employment on the basis of mere membership in an
organization.169 There was testimony that the state employees were unaware
of the intentions of the party they had affiliated with.170 The Court highlighted
this distinction between innocent and knowing association and declared the
loyalty oath unconstitutional on Due Process grounds.171 The Court
172

Constitutional protection extends to public employees who have been
excluded due to facially discriminatory or arbitrary laws.173 More than a
decade later, the Court decided Elfbrandt v. Russell, where it struck down an
Arizona act as unconstitutional for requiring state employees to take an
oath.174 The oath read that state employees would not be members of
organizations having a purpose of overthrowing the government.175 The
Court found this oath troublesome due to its vagueness because it restricted
membership in parties that followed both legal and illegal means and created
unlawful beliefs.176
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members would be penalized just for being a member of the organization.177
The Court ultimately found that the oath unnecessarily infringed on protected
,
doctrine this nation supports.178
recognized and began to apply the doctrine of compelled speech to situations
affecting everyday life. The Supreme Court took an interesting turn in 1995
when it placed the rights of a private parade organizer over the rights of
LGBTQ parade marchers in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston.179 This case prompted a rather interesting question
dealing with private entities: Can the government compel private
180
org
If so, the government
might be able to require the NFL players to stand during the National Anthem
as a sign of respect. This seems to be a rather novel concept, as all the cases
focusing on this very question have been decided within the past fifteen
years.
The first case to touch on this issue was Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. in 2006.181 In Rumsfeld, an amendment
stated that if an institution for higher education denied access to military
recruiters, the institution would lose federal funding.182 Certain law schools
wanted to prohibit military recruiters because many of them did not support
a congressional policy related to homosexuals in the military.183 The law
schools filed suit against the Department of Defense arguing that the
association.184 In arriving at a decision, the Court once again relied on
Barnette and its establishment of the compelled speech doctrine, as the Court
reiterated that the First Amendment also prohibits the government from
telling people what they have to say.185 The Court ultimately held that no
compelled speech issue persisted in this case dealing with a federal law
requiring law schools to give military recruiters the same access as other

177
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recruiters.186 The Court came to this conclusion because it argued that the
amendment did not force the law schools to say anything or say something
specific.187
In 2018, the Supreme Court came out with two more decisions related
to compelled speech. The second case the Court decided in 2018 was Janus
v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council
31. This case involved an Illinois law that ultimately forced employees to
unionize.188 The law specifically held that if the majority of employees voted
to be unionized, the union was the sole representative of all the employees,
even those that did not vote for a union.189 In addition, the nonmembers also
had to pay part of the union dues, which were set by the union itself.190 Janus,
a state employee, decided not to join his union; however, because the
majority of employees chose to unionize, Janus was required to pay dues.191
He filed suit claiming that the process was unconstitutional for compelling
individuals to support ideas that they did not agree with, therefore violating
the First Amendment.192 The Court agreed with Janus and found that this was
a form of compelled speech since Janus did not consent to paying the dues.193
194

ition,
195

An interesting idea to note is how some courts have reacted to speech
made by fans in a public sports stadium. This is more of a recent
development, but it may provide some insight as to how courts will view the
sports setting,
fan speech contains similar complexities to employee speech, but overall fans
are typically permitted to engage in free speech in publicly owned
stadiums.196 The Supreme Court in Cohen v. California held that the
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he was charged with disturbing the peace.197 This holding in Cohen extends
to fans with similar displays of profane messages regarding opposing sports
teams and players.
B.

Compelled Speech in the NFL

The NFL brings a rather interesting conversation to the application of
compelled speech. While the NFL is a private organization, it is not directly
subject to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, as we have
previously seen, there are a few circumstances when a private actor may still
be held accountable as a state actor under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Assuming the symbiotic test or another test is applicable to the
NFL and the National Anthem controversy, the gates would be open to
subjecting the NFL to violations of the First Amendment through compelled
speech.
In analyzing the relationship between the NFL and its players, we begin
with the application of the Pickering balance test. The key is to balance the
interests of the NFL as the employer in promoting an efficient organization
against the interests of the players, the employees, on speaking about matters
of public concern.198
control over the organization are compelling because of the controversial
nature surrounding the National Anthem issue. The tension surrounding the
issue creates even more pressure for the NFL to take control and preserve
compelling, as they are ultimately addressing matters of public concern
police brutality amongst ethnic minorities. Just as the school teacher in
Pickering was speaking out about school funding, an issue important to the
community,199 so too are the players speaking out about issues affecting their
200
In
Connick also support the
players in their interests.201 The c
that affect them and others in the community. The form of their speech is
done through kneeling during the National Anthem. This is not disruptive to
uring the entire
important.
This protesting is not attempting to draw attention to a minor issue in which
197
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many people are not familiar with. The players are addressing concerns
within their own communities, affecting their own friends, families, and coworkers. The concern of police brutality against minorities has become such
a heated political debate, so much so that people cannot even seem to discuss
the matter peacefully. As a result, the players have relied on their status to
raise awareness.
Because the players are employees of the NFL, we must also apply
Garcetti
pursuant to their official duties of being professional athletes.202 If this is so,
the players are not afforded First Amendment protection because the NFL
maintains its power to control the duties of its employees. However, the
players do not seem to be protesting anything remotely tied to their official
duties as football players. As a professional athlete, they are likely expected
to show up to practices, follow a rigid diet, attend press events, and perform
well during games amongst other duties. Protesting social injustices do not
appear to be a duty expected of the players in being professional athletes.
Amendment. Moreover, in preventing the players from protesting and forcing
l[ing] the flow of
oath upon the players.203 As Wieman and Elfbrandt held, loyalty oaths are
disfavored in public employment and cannot be used to penalize employees
for merely exercising their freedom of speech.204 However, the loyalty oath
cases only apply to public employees.
Recently, the courts have attempted to address whether the government
205
The
courts tend to look for a clear sign that the government is forcing an
organization to support its ideas. Because of this narrow finding, the National
Anthem controversy presents a similar outcome to the one reached in
Rumsfeld. The government is not particularly forcing the players to say
anything or say something specific.206 President Trump criticized the players
for kneeling, but he never stated that the players had to say certain comments
about the flag or the United States. As a result, there does not seem to be a
compelled speech issue with the players in the NFL. Under the Janus
framework, the results might vary. Similar to the state employee forced to
pay union dues in Janus, the NFL (if found as acting under the color of law)
202
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cannot compel its players to stand during the National Anthem if the players
decide not to support those views. Forcing free and independent individuals
to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First Amendment
207

To close off the employee compelled speech section, it will be
interesting to see how the courts will decide issues dealing with sports
organizations in the future. Will they apply a similar analysis to the one used
when fans express themselves in stadiums? Or will they take a different route
and apply a more restricted test? The inquiry becomes more complex when
looking at private organizations, such as the NFL, especially when collective
actions and finding exceptions to the agreement are very difficult to do.
III. THE NEXT ROUND OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: WHAT TO
EXPECT
As we have seen, the NFL National Anthem controversy contains
several legal issues in need of resolution before the next round of collective
bargaining
media have not been enough to hint at what could be expected, one can
assume that discussions will most definitely intensify the closer we get to
2021. Several players have also spoken out about a potential lockout once the
current 10-year collective bargaining agreement expires in 2021.208 The
all the drama and chaos surrounding the National Anthem issue, it comes as
no surprise that the players will be looking for more protected rights under
the next CBA. This lockout could last as long as, if not longer than, the
previous lockout in 2011. The 2011 lockout occurred over the course of four
months but did not interfere with any pre-season or regular season games.209
Some believe this lockout could have lasted longer if the players had prepared
better for it.210 As a result, the players seem ready to negotiate during this
next round, meaning a long and arduous battle looms ahead. As tensions
continue to run high, the players will likely fight harder and longer to secure
more rights and protections under the CBA.

207

138 S. Ct. 2448, 2456 (2018).

208

Chris Chavez,
,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/08/22/nfl-lockout-inevitable-ericwinston-players-union.
209
210

Id.
Id.

424

Take an L or Take a Knee?

[Vol. 14:397

Another probable change that is expected to come out of the 2021
collective bargaining process is a new rule regarding the National Anthem.
NFL game, and all players must be on the sideline for the National
211
Further, the policy mentions that players should stand, but there
is no explicit requirement that players must stand.212 In negotiations
preceding the new 2021 CBA, the NFL likely will seek to include a modified
provis
game, and all players who are on the field must stand for the National
213
The players will likely be upset with this proposition and they
will struggle to negotiate this rule. While the players strongly oppose this
rule, the team owners will want a strict policy regarding these protests.214 The
players possible arguments include that this change could impact their
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Players would argue that
although the policy change might not directly punish players, it nevertheless
adversely affects the employment of players who protest in violation of the
new policy.215
proposed rule could be challenged under federal antitrust laws.216 Because it
collectively bargained for, the players would have standing to challenge it.217
This is in direct opposition to Kaepernick
the NFL after he alleged that the teams in the league conspired to prohibit
him from playing on any team due to his initiation of the protests during the
National Anthem. While these are just some of the plausible arguments that
both sides might make, we will have to wait and see exactly what arguments
each side brings to the table in 2021.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In 2016, quarterback Colin Kaepernick caused a national uproar when
he decided to kneel during the National Anthem of an NFL pre-season game.
On one hand, people praised him for bringing attention to a controversial
issue police brutality against minorities. On the other hand, people
criticized him for disrespecting the flag, the country, and all the men and
women in the military who fight every day for our freedom. The NFL sought
a way to stop Kaepernick from engaging in this contentious behavior, but
legal issues began to surround the league and the players. Some have
attempted to argue that the First Amendment is applicable to the NFL, a
private organization. The arguments related to this theory are discussed in
this paper. To hold the NFL liable for violating the First Amendment in
State action can be found in private organizations as well, through several
tests such as traditional and exclusive public functions, symbiotic
relationship, close nexus, or entwinement. In addition, the role of the United
States military and the President and Vice President might help create state
action within the NFL. After state action is proven, employee compelled
speech and how it applies to the private setting of the NFL must also be
addressed. Lastly, there are some key arguments likely to be negotiated by
both sides during the next round of collective bargaining in 2021. The next
couple of years in the NFL will certainly be exciting and challenging, as both
to control its operations.

